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BANKRUPTCY-JURISDICTION OF BANKRUPTCY CouRT TO DETERMINE SToCKHOLDERs' VoTE NECESSARY To APPROVE PROPOSED SALE oF CoRPORATioN's
AssETS To DEBTOR IN REORGANIZATION-Lessee railroad, which had leased and
operated property of lessor railroad for many years, entered reorganization under
section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act.1 Under the plan of reorganization promulgated
by the Interstate Commerce Commission and approved by the bankruptcy court,
lessor was given the alternative of selling its property to the reorganized railroad or
having the lease disaffirmed by the debtor and its property returned. This proposal
was submitted for acceptance by a majority vote of lessor's stockholders. Respondents, stockholders of lessor, sought an injunction in a state court of Georgia to
restrain lessor's officers from certifying the acceptance in the event that a majority
approved the sale, on the theory that state law prevented the sale of all corporate
assets without unan.imous approval by the stockholders. Before the state court
acted, a majority of lessor's stockholders voted to approve the sale. The bankruptcy
court then confirmed the plan, found the acceptance valid under state law and
enjoined respondents from further prosecution of the action in the state court.
Despite this, the state court enjoined lessor's officers from selling its property.
The bankruptcy court then permanently enjoined prosecution of the state
action and declared the state court injunction void. This decree was reversed by the
circuit court of appeals. 2 On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court,
held, affirmed (two justices dissenting). The bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction to enjoin the suit in the state court, since the controversy did not involve
property of the debtor within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court under section
77. Callaway v. Benton, 336 U.S. 132, 69 S. Ct. 435 (1949).
The Court was unanimous in holding that state law should apply, since the
bankruptcy court has no statutory authority to apply federal law to a question
like the one presented in the principal case.3 The important question facing
the Court was whether the bankruptcy court had exclusive jurisdiction to inter-

49 Stat. L. 911 (1935), 11 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1948) §205.
Benton v. Callaway, (C.C.A. 5th, 1948) 165 F. (2d) 877.
See Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79, 60 S.Ct. 34 (1939); Seaboard Air Line R.
Co. v. Daniel, 333 U.S. 118, 68 S.Ct. 426 (1948); and cf. Schwabacher v. United States,
334 U.S. 182, 68 S.Ct. 958 (1948), where federal law was applied rather than state law.
See Meck, "The Problems of the Leased Line," 7 LAW AND CoNT. Pnoll. 509 (1940).
1
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pret the applicable state law. Under section 77a, the bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction over the debtor and its property in a reorganization proceeding.4
The courts have ·applied traditional concepts in defining the term property to
include the debtor's estate in its actual or constructive posse!ision; thus the court
may determine all claims and rights pertaining thereto. 5 But the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court does not include all controversies that in some
way affect the debtor's estate.6 In the principal case, the majority of the Court held
that since the controversy involved the reversion in fee, the bankruptcy court
lacked jurisdiction; a question of internal management of the lessor railroad
was presented, rather than a controversy concerning property of the lessee under
section 77a.7 Petitioner further argued that the injunction was valid because
the bankruptcy court has the power to enjoin any action which delays the forihulation or promulgation of a reorganization plan.8 There was, however, no finding
by the bankruptcy court of any delay resulting from the state court action. In the
strong dissent of Justice Douglas, in which Justice Rutledge joined, it was argued
that sectjon 77 gives the bankruptcy court exclusive jurisdiction over acceptance
and confirmation of the plan in all its phases, and that it was not the intent
of Congress to restrict the court's exclusive jurisdiction to protection of the debtor's
property. It is difficult tu find a basis for this contention in the statute. Justice
Douglas' position is based on language in section 77e9 which deals, not with a
sale by a corporation to the debtor in reorganization, hut with acceptances of
the plan by creditors of the debtor who have properly filed claims under section
4

See note I, supra.

5 Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.. 309 U.S. 478, 60 S.Ct. 628 (1940); 6 CoLLIER
BANKRUPTCY, 14th ed., ,r3.05 (1947). For cases interpreting sec. 77a, see Ex parte Baldwin, 291 U.S. 610, 54 S.Ct. 551 (1934); Warren v. Palmer, 310 U.S. ~32, 60 S.Ct. 865
(1940); New York Trust Co. v. New York & Greenwood Lake Ry. Co., (C.C.A. 3d, 1946),
156 F. (2d) 701. In re Pittsburgh Rys. Co., (C.C.A. 3d, 1946) 155 F. (2d) 477, the lessor
was brought into the reorganization proceeding because the lessor and lessee were treated as
one corporation, so that jurisdiction over the lessee also embraced the lessor. From the facts
in the principal case there is some basis for arguing that the transportation system should have
been treated as an entity, since it was operated as a single unit for many years.
6 Arkansas Corp. Comm. v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 132, 61 S.Ct. 888 (1941); In re
Central R. Co., (C.C.A. 3d, 1944) 163 F. (2d) 44; Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565,
67 S.Ct. 467 (1947); Thompson v. Terminal Shares, Inc., (C.C.A. 8th,. 1939) 104 F. (2d) I.
, 7 See Group of Institutional Investors v. Chi., M. St.P. & P.R. Co., 318 U.S. 523, 63
S.Ct. 727 (1942). Although the Court there stated that the bankruptcy court had not treated
lessor's property as property of the lessee debtor for reorganization purposes, the question of the
court's power to do so was not raised.
s This power rests on the inherent powers of a court of equity to prevent the defeat or
impairment of its jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1948) §1651; and under §2 (15)
of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. §11 (191) 1927, which gives the bankruptcy court
power to issue such orders as may be necessary to enforce the provisions of the act. See
Continental ill. Natl. Bk. & Trust Co. of Chi. v. Chi., R. I. P. R. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 55
S.Ct, 595 (1935); In re Boston Terminal (D.C. Mass. 1947) 71 F. Supp. 472; Thompson
v. Tex. Mex. R. Co., 328 U.S. 134, 66 S.Ct. 937 (1946).
.
9 Note I, supra. This section states that the judge shall confirm the plan if it has been
accepted by creditors holding two-thirds in amount of the total allowed claims and if such
acceptances have not been made or procured by any means forbidden by law.
ON
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77c.10 It seems clear that Congress did not intend to give the court broad power
over all problems affecting the reorganization proceedings, 11 and there appears
to be no reason why the bankruptcy court should determine matters concerning
the internal management of a corporation which are involved in the reorganization proceedings only because of past business transactions with the debtor.

Bernard Goldstone, S. Ed.

10 Note 1, supra. Lessor is a creditor in the proceedings only by virtue of its claims against
the debtor under the lease and for the breach of the lease. Principal case at 146-147.
11 See Leiman v. Guttman, 336 U.S. 1, 69 S.Ct. 371 (1949), where broad power was
given to the reorganization court, including authority over all fee agreements payable out of
non-estate funds.

